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The Economics of Security

| By | Business of Security, Executive Perspectives, Security Perspective

During many of my customer meetings, I often hear security leaders ask the question: “What technology could I remove to free up budget to enable the implementation of FireEye?”

My natural response is to inquire how and when they assess the real value, not the ROI, they get from their existing solutions. Whilst every security solution provides an “ROI” – often a metric based around industry data on how many security “events” they return – this assessment should not focus on noisy “ROI,” but which solution gives your company the most valuable information. Considering the nature and pace of change when it comes to malware and advanced attacks, this is something to validate regularly and involves looking at more factors than a generic ROI tool can factor in.

In a small survey of about 30 European CxOs we ran in December 2013, I asked the question of how they validated the value of security controls, and, surprisingly, at least 36 percent still didn’t conduct any annual assessment.

doyouvalidate

Having spent quite a bit of time looking at analyst models and what exists publically today, the fact that some still don’t conduct these assessments emphasizes that there still isn’t a well-defined model to correlate business value against investment for security solutions.

Take, for example, the outsourced model where Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are typically established. Too often I hear anecdotal examples where KPIs were based on incidents found; this simply encourages dialing-up the technologies being monitored so that every incident – malicious or not – is tracked and reported, drowning out the ability to identify real threats.

For example, companies investing in big data solutions that gather and equate the millions to billions of events delivered each week to value. However, because they are too resource-constrained to convert these into actionable data, the true value is not extracted and, because doing so in a resource-constrained environment takes so long, the return here would seem extremely poor to a sheer numbers-based evaluation.

However, if the value of said product is measured by the actions taken to mitigate a major security event, that extra time spent executing on a few major items rather than not executing on a large amount of items becomes invaluable to the business. As such, we must blend together the quantitative metrics such as the costs of a solution (capex & opex), incident levels and overlay those values with qualitative insight. These evaluation criterion would look something like the below:

opexcapex

 

  • Noise to incident ratio - What is an acceptable incident to noise (i.e., false positives or irrelevant alerts) ratio?
  • Volume versus impact - We can alert and respond to a million incidents but it’s the one outage of a critical system or breach of business IP or customer records will have a far more significant impact on the business.
  • How actionable is the solution - Critical to an alert is timeliness, how long does it take to identify an incident and what level of human skills are required to interpret the results. Spotting a breach is hard, doing the forensics is harder, and understanding the motives of the attacker is harder still.
  • Business outcome - Did a technology mitigate, reduce or simply delay the business impact. Did it tick a compliance control to avoid penalty fees or did it protect IP & customer data?

In the coming months we are going to delve into the economics of security in greater detail. Whilst there are many tools out there discussing security process and ROI tools showing generic return, we all have limited budget and resources. With the scale and scope of security tools continues to grow we must innovate our thinking, in how we each quantify the value of our investments.

 

 

Crimeware or APT? Malware’s “Fifty Shades of Grey”

| By and | Advanced Malware, Threat Research

Some cybercriminals build massive botnets to use unsuspecting endpoints for spam, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, or large-scale click fraud. With the aid of banking Trojans, other cybercriminals create smaller, specialized botnets that focus on stealing bank credentials and credit card information.

Remote access tools, or RATs, are an integral part of the cybercrime toolbox. For example, a recent FireEye investigation into XtremeRAT revealed that it had been propagated by spam campaigns that typically distribute Zeus variants and other banking-focused malware. This tactic may stem in part from the realization that compromising retailers can net millions of credit card numbers in one fell swoop.

Malware designed to compromise point-of-sale (POS) systems is not a new phenomenon. But we have seen a recent surge in malware that specifically targets these systems (e.g. Chewbacca, Dexter, BlackPOS and JackPOS). Moreover, POS malware is being deployed in an increasingly targeted manner. For example, some attacks against retailers have been characterized as “APT style” attacks — a designation traditionally reserved for malware-based espionage sponsored on some level by nation-states.

The extent to which such attacks are targeted, and not opportunistic, is unclear. The attackers could be singling out specific retailers in advance. Or they could be targeting an entire industry, simply capitalizing on opportunities that arise.

In this blog post, we examine one case that clearly illustrates the nature of this problem.

Continue reading »

Occupy Your Icons Silently on Android

| By , and | Mobile Threats, Threat Research, Vulnerabilities

FireEye mobile security researchers have discovered a new Android security issue: a malicious app with normal protection level permissions can probe icons on Android home screen and modify them to point to phishing websites or the malicious app itself without notifying the user. Google has acknowledged this issue and released the patch to its OEM partners.

Normal vs. Dangerous Permissions: A Background

Android Open Source Project (AOSP) classifies Android permissions into several protection levels: “normal”, “dangerous”, “system”, “signature” and “development” [1][2][3].

Dangerous permissions “may be displayed to the user and require confirmation before proceeding, or some other approach may be taken to avoid the user automatically allowing the use of such facilities”. In contrast, normal permissions are automatically granted at installation, “without asking for the user's explicit approval (though the user always has the option to review these permissions before installing)” [1].

On the latest Android 4.4.2 system, if an app requests both dangerous permissions and normal permissions, Android only displays the dangerous permissions, as shown in Figure 1. If an app requests only normal permissions, Android doesn’t display them to the user, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 1. An Android app asks for one dangerous permission (INTERNET) and some normal permissions (Launcher’s READ_SETTINGS and WRITE_SETTINGS). Android doesn’t notify the user about the normal permissions.

Figure 1. An Android app asks for one dangerous permission (INTERNET) and some normal permissions (Launcher’s READ_SETTINGS and WRITE_SETTINGS). Android doesn’t notify the user about the normal permissions.

Figure 2. An Android app asks for normal permissions (Launcher’s READ_SETTINGS and WRITE_SETTINGS) only. Android doesn’t show any permission to the user.

Figure 2. An Android app asks for normal permissions (Launcher’s READ_SETTINGS and WRITE_SETTINGS) only. Android doesn’t show any permission to the user.

Normal Permissions Can Be Dangerous

We have found that certain “normal” permissions have dangerous security impacts. Using these normal permissions, a malicious app can replace legit Android home screen icons with fake ones that point to phishing apps or websites.

The ability to manipulate Android home screen icons, when abused, can help an attacker deceive the user. There’s no surprise that the com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT permission, which allows an app to create icons, was recategorized from “normal” to “dangerous” ever since Android 4.2. Though this is an important security improvement, an attacker can still manipulate Android home screen icons using two normal permissions: com.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS and com.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS. These two permissions enable an app to query, insert, delete, or modify the whole configuration settings of the Launcher, including the icon insertion or modification. Unfortunately, these two permissions have been labeled as “normal” since Android 1.x.

As a proof of concept attack scenario, a malicious app with these two permissions can query/insert/alter the system icon settings and modify legitimate icons of some security-sensitive apps, such as banking apps, to a phishing website. We tested and confirmed this attack on a Nexus 7 device with Android 4.4.2. (Note: The testing website was brought down quickly and nobody else ever connected to it.) Google Play doesn’t prevent this app from being published and there’s no warning when a user downloads and installs it. (Note: We have removed the app from Google Play quickly and nobody else downloaded this app.)

Lastly, this vulnerability is not limited to Android devices running AOSP. We have also examined devices that use non-AOSP Launchers, including Nexus 7 with CyanogenMod 4.4.2, Samsung Galaxy S4 with Android 4.3 and HTC One with Android 4.4.2. All of them have the protection levels of com.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS and WRITE_SETTINGS as “normal”.

Google acknowledged this vulnerability and has released the patch to its OEM partners. Many android vendors were slow to adapt security upgrades. We urge these vendors to patch vulnerabilities more quickly to protect their users.

References:

  1. http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/permission-element.html
  2. https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/master/core/res/AndroidManifest.xml
  3. https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/apps/Launcher2/+/master/AndroidManifest.xml

Annual M-Trends Report Looks Beyond the Breach

| By | Advanced Threat Trends, Business of Security, Executive Perspectives, Security Perspective

Since 2010, Mandiant’s annual threat report, “M-Trends” has provided the industry with in-depth analysis and insight based on hundreds of advanced threat investigations conducted during the previous calendar year for the U.S. government, the defense industrial base and commercial organizations. As a leader in combating advanced threats, FireEye stresses the continuous education that needs to take place in order to be one step ahead of attackers. That is why it is with great excitement that I present the fifth installment of M-Trends.

2013 was an explosive year for the cybersecurity industry; a result of Mandiant’s APT1 report, The New York Times breach, and other organizations coming to the forefront to openly discuss their own incidents. In addition, President Obama discussed concerns about cyber-attacks in his annual State of the Union address. This was a huge step for the industry in terms of bringing advanced attacks to the forefront of the nation, and the world’s, attention.

This year’s report compiles incident response trends from hundreds of clients in more than 30 industry sectors. Some highlights include:

  • The time it takes to detect a compromise continues to improve
    The median number of days it takes an organization to discover a network breach dropped to 229 days in 2013 from 243 in 2012. This improvement is incremental relative to the drop from 416 days in 2011. However, organizations can unknowingly be breached for years. The longest time an attacker operated undetected in a network before being discovered was six years and three months in 2013.
  • Organizations are yet to improve their ability to detect breaches
    In 2012, 37 percent of organizations detected breaches on their own. This number dropped only minimally, to just 33 percent in 2013.
  • Phishing emails largely look to capitalize on trust in IT departments
    44 percent of the phishing emails observed in attacks investigated by Mandiant sought to impersonate the IT departments of the target’s workplace. The vast majority of these emails were sent on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday.
  • Political conflicts increasingly have cyber components that impact private organizations
    In the past year, Mandiant responded to an increased number of incidents where political conflicts between nations spawned cyber-attacks that impacted the private sector. Specifically, Mandiant investigated incidents where the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised external-facing websites and social media accounts of organizations with the primary motive of raising awareness for their political cause.
  • Suspected Iran-based threat actors conduct reconnaissance on energy sector and state governments
    Multiple investigations of suspected Iran-based network reconnaissance activity indicates that threat actors are actively engaging in surveillance activities at energy sector companies and state government agencies. While these suspected Iran-based actors appear less capable than other nation-state actors, nothing stands in the way of them testing and improving their capabilities.

Click here to request a copy of the report.

Let us know your thoughts by leaving a comment below.

DLL Side-Loading: Another Blind-Spot for Anti-Virus

| By | Exploits, Threat Research, Vulnerabilities

Last month, I presented a talk at the RSA USA Conference on an increasingly popular threat vector called “Dynamic-Link Library Side-Loading” (DLL Side-Loading). As with many vulnerabilities, this exploit has existed for a rather long time and is the result of Microsoft looking to make binary updates easier for Windows developers through the Windows side-by-side (WinSxS) assembly feature.

Now, though, advanced persistent threat (APT) developers are using the innocuous DLL Side-Loading method to sneak malware past anti-virus (AV) scanners as the infected files run in-memory. In doing-so, the malicious payload is using a benign application to be built in memory, meaning that the malware does not sit running in the file system where AV scans take place. In the figure below, you can see an example of how this all plays out:

DLLpic

For a real-life example: in 2013, attackers exploited the executable originally developed by Fortune 50 company using this technique in a highly targeted attack. In such an attacks, the malware places a spoofed, malicious DLL file in a Windows’ WinSxS directory so that the operating system loaded the spoofed DLL instead of the legitimate file. Furthermore, because the file in-question was white-listed by hash in a public database, AV simply ignores it altogether.

In response to the growing use of DLL Side-Loading in APTs, we have developed a full paper that describes the history of DLL Side-Loading and its role in the malware and software engineering arenas which you can review here: https://www.fireeyesolution.com/resources/pdfs/fireeye-dll-sideloading.pdf

 

 

Real World vs Lab Testing: The FireEye Response to NSS Labs Breach Detection Systems Report

| By | Security Perspective

Today, NSS Labs released a report detailing the performance of several vendors’ ability to detect advanced attacks. We declined to participate in this test because we believe the NSS methodology is severely flawed. In fact, the FireEye product they used was not even fully functional, leveraged an old version of our software and didn’t have access to our threat intelligence (unlike our customers). We did participate in the BDS test in 2013 and at that time we also commented on the flaws of the testing methodology. In fact, we insisted that the only way to properly test was to run in a REAL environment. NSS declined to change their testing methodology so we declined to participate in the most recent test, results of which have been published today. When NSS tested our product a year ago, they used a sample set that included 348 total samples. FireEye detected 201 of 348 total samples. Of the 147 “missed” samples:

  • 11 were non-malicious.
  • 19 were corrupted (as to why other vendors detected these because some vendors scored higher – close to 100% - means that their detection engines are based on hashes which will match regardless of whether the sample is malicious).
  • 117 were duplicates (as to why FireEye didn’t receive credit for detecting these, we never received a response from NSS).

Clearly, nobody could take this approach seriously—it was a major mismatch versus what we see in the wild.

Understanding advanced threats still represents a black hole for many in today’s security industry. The test unfortunately perpetuates a general failure by many to fully understand and appreciate the inner workings of advanced threats that continue to plague organizations despite millions invested in legacy security technologies. In this case, the test contained a number of flaws that security professionals should thoroughly understand before taking these results at face value.

Issue #1: Poor sample selection. Specifically:

  • NSS mostly relied on VirusTotal to download payloads (clear text executable files). The NSS sample set doesn’t include Unknowns, Complex Malware (Encoded/Encrypted Exploit Code & Payload), and APTs. Almost by definition, APTs use new or updated code to bypass detection, which is standard procedure. However, NSS used a known corpus of malware. Advanced threats are in, out, and cleaned-up in minutes. In the past, the malware samples used in the NSS tests were available on VirusTotal (an aside: the oldest sample on VirusTotal is from 2006 and the median sample age is 17.2 months). By contrast, when tests specifically leverage malware samples that are new and unknown, antivirus detection rates fall dramatically. For example, the Imperva study found that antivirus detected only 5% of malware. The other vendors in the NSS report are built for detecting known malware. By relying on VirusTotal, NSS missed out on AK-47s and spent time analyzing pea shooters.
  • Even for Payloads, NSS doesn’t perform Forensics Analysis to understand if the sample is malicious, goodware or corrupt (can’t execute). NSS gives a positive score as long as a vendor sees the sample on the wire, even if the sample is not actually malicious.

 

Issue #2: Differing definitions of advanced malware: Vendors and test agencies differ in how they define advanced malware. The NSS test confused Adware, Spyware, & APTs and accounted for Adware and Spyware as APTs. For instance, some of the NSS tests expected Adware to be classified as malware. In this series of tests, Adware that changes the home page of the browser, but does not infect the system in any other way, must be flagged as malware by a product in order to receive a positive score. FireEye solutions wait for true malicious behavior to avoid false alerts. In the aforementioned case, the page load of the new home page would be analyzed to identify if the change was truly malicious or not.

Issue #3: Poor test methodology. Specifically, the NSS test:

  • Doesn’t account for the use of zero day exploits. There were no zero day exploits in the test sample. This is difficult to do. Testing for zero days requires having a zero day on hand or developing one yourself, which is expensive. Finding new malware that utilizes zero day exploits is where FireEye thrives. In 2013, we found 11 exploitable zero days as well as countless malware campaigns used in cyber espionage, warfare or crime. This year, we have already uncovered two zero days.
  • Did not have access to our security intelligence in the cloud. Unlike our customers, the FireEye appliances were NOT connected to our Dynamic Threat Intelligence cloud to get latest content updates, virtual machines and detection capabilities.

We respect NSS and the work they do—especially for IPS – and their testing methodology for BDS is also more suited to testing IPS products. However, we believe the issues we identified with their evaluation of advanced threats are indicative of the security industry’s broader lack of knowledge regarding sophisticated attacks. FireEye is designed to supplement legacy signature and reputation based technologies to protect against advanced threats—and the NSS tests didn’t properly gauge our capabilities. Our product’s efficacy is proven by how well we protect customers in real-world deployments. Consider that in 2013, FireEye:

  • Found 11 exploitable zero day vulnerabilities, with two uncovered so far in 2014. (By comparison, among the top 10 cyber security companies ranked by security-related revenue, only 2 other zero-day vulnerability were reported in 2013.)
  • Tracked more than 40 million callbacks.
  • Tracked more than 300 separate APT campaigns.
  • Deployed more than 2 million virtual machines globally.

Any lab test is fundamentally unable to replicate the targeted, advanced attacks launched by sophisticated criminal networks and nation-states. The best way to evaluate FireEye is for organizations to deploy our technology in their own environment and they will understand why we are the market leader in stopping advanced attacks. We believe it is erroneous for NSS to compare security efficacy, performance, and cost in the same graphic, because doing so assumes that all three buying criteria are all equally important. In our experience, security efficacy is much more important than the others. In fact, most users and vendors are moving toward a malware prevention, detection, and response architecture.

In August 2013, IDC issued a report, Worldwide Specialized Threat Analysis and Protection 2013–2017 Forecast and 2012 Vendor Shares. This report identified and ranked vendors claiming to stop advanced malware attacks. FireEye was listed as the top vendor based on market share (38%) compared to the nearest competitor with 14% market share. The market is voting with dollars based on their real-world experience while under real-world attacks from advanced threats.

APT1: The State of the Hack One Year Later

| By | Advanced Threat Trends, Business of Security, Executive Perspectives, Security Perspective

A little over a year ago, Mandiant released a report that brought the term “Advanced Persistent Threat” (APT) into the public conversation and made these types of targeted attacks top of mind for government and commercial organizations around the world. Recently, FireEye COO, Kevin Mandia took the stage at RSA USA 2014 to take a look back and share his perspective on the activities that led to the release of the APT1 report and the aftermath.

While the initial report caused a media frenzy, unquestionably, the most important part of the story is the aftermath. Mandiant released the report to elevate the dialogue and address the frustration of organizations that were throwing money at cybersecurity problems and still facing attacks. Yet, the results were not what we expected.

Watch the video below for Kevin’s full speech and feel free to drop a comment below to continue the discussion.

Android.MisoSMS : Its Back! Now With XTEA

| By and | Advanced Malware, Mobile Threats, Threat Research

FireEye Labs recently found a more advanced variant of Android.MisoSMS, the SMS-stealing malware that we uncovered last December — yet another sign of cybercriminals’ growing interest in hijacking mobile devices for surveillance and data theft.

Like the original version of the malware, the new variant sends copies of users’ text messages to servers in China. But the newest rendition adds a few features that make it harder to detect, including a new disguise, encrypted transmissions, and command-and-control (CnC) communications that are handled natively rather than over email.

FireEye Mobile Threat Prevention customers are already protected from both variants.

Continue reading »

A Little Bird Told Me: Personal Information Sharing in Angry Birds and its Ad Libraries

| By , and | Mobile Threats, Threat Research

Many popular mobile apps, including Rovio’s ubiquitous Angry Birds, collect and share players’ personal information much more widely than most people realize.

Some news reports have begun to scratch the surface of the situation. The New York Times reported on Angry Birds and other data-hungry apps last October. And in January, the newspaper teamed up with public-interest news site ProPublica and U.K. newspaper the Guardian for a series of stories detailing how government agencies use the game (and other mobile apps) to collect personal data. Even the long-running CBS show 60 Minutes reported earlier this month that Rovio shares users’ locations.

The Android version of Angry Birds in the Google Play store, updated on March 4, continues to share personal information. In fact, more than a quarter billion users who create Rovio accounts to save their game progress across multiple devices might be unwittingly sharing all kinds of information—age, gender, and more — with multiple parties. And many more users who play the game without a Rovio account are sharing their device information without realizing it.

Once a Rovio account is created and personal information uploaded, the user can do little to stop this personal information sharing. Their data might be in multiple locations: Angry Birds Cloud, Burstly (ad mediation platform), and third-party ad networks such as Jumptap and Millennial Media. Users can avoid sharing personal data by playing Angry Birds without Rovio account, but that won’t stop the game from sharing device information.

In this blog post, we examine the personal information Angry Birds collects. We also demonstrate the relationships between the app, the ad mediation platform, and the ad clouds — showing how the information flows among the three. We also spell out the evidence, such as network packet capture (PCap) from FireEye Mobile Threat Prevention (MTP), to support our information flow chart. Finally, we reveal how the multi-stage information sharing works by tracking the code paths from the reverse-engineered source code.

Continue reading »

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Black Hat USA Talks: Investigating PowerShell Attacks

| By | Threat Research |
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Threat actors are always eager to adopt new tools, tactics, and procedures that can help them evade detection and conduct their mission. Incident responders from Mandiant have observed increasing use of PowerShell by targeted attackers to conduct command-and-control in compromised Windows networks. As a trusted administration tool built-in to all modern versions of Windows, PowerShell provides the ability to access remote systems, execute commands, transfer files, load malicious code, and interact with underlying components of the operating system – all tasks for which attackers must otherwise rely on malware. This has created a whole new playground of intrusion techniques for intruders that have already established a foothold on systems in a corporate network.

Ryan Kazanciyan and Matt Hastings will talk about the use of PowerShell throughout the attack lifecycle and the sources of evidence it leaves behind in memory, on disk, in logs, and elsewhere. They will demonstrate how to collect and interpret these forensic artifacts, both on individual systems and at scale. Throughout the presentation, they will include examples from real-world incidents.

Attend this presentation on August 7 at 4:05pm PT in South Seas GH. Make sure to use #BHUSA and @FireEye if you plan to tweet highlights from the talk.

To view the whitepaper, click here.

Black Hat USA Talks: Sidewinder Targeted Attack Against Android in The Golden Age of Ad Libs

| By | Advanced Malware, Threat Research |
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While Google Play has little malware, many vulnerabilities exist in the apps as well as the Android system itself, and aggressive ad libs leak a lot of user privacy information. When they are combined together, more powerful targeted attacks can be conducted.

In this presentation, FireEye’s Yulong Zhang and Tao Wei will present one practical case of such attacks called “Sidewinder Targeted Attack.” It targets victims by intercepting location information reported from ad libs, which can be used to locate targeted areas such as a CEO’s office or some specific conference rooms. When the target is identified, “Sidewinder Targeted Attack” exploits popular vulnerabilities in ad libs, such as Javascript-binding-over-HTTP or dynamic-loading-over-HTTP, etc.

During the exploit, it is a well-known challenge to call Android services from injected native code due to the lack of Android application context. So they will also demonstrate how attackers can invoke Android services such as taking photos, calling phone numbers, sending SMS, reading/writing the clipboard, etc. Once intruding into the target, the attackers can exploit several Android vulnerabilities to get valuable privacy information or initiate more advanced attacks. We will reveal how to exploit new vulnerabilities we discovered in this phase.

In addition, they will show demos using real-world apps downloaded from Google Play.

Although they notified Google, ad vendors and app developers about related issues half a year ago, there are still millions of users under the threat of “Sidewinder Targeted Attacks” due to the slow patching/upgrading/fragmentation of the Android ecosystem.

Attend this presentation on August 7 at 10:15am PT in South Seas GH. Make sure to use #BHUSA and @FireEye if you plan to tweet highlights from the talk.

To view the whitepaper, click here.

Black Hat USA Talks - Leviathan: Command And Control Communications On Planet Earth

| By | Targeted Attack, Threat Research |
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Every day, computer network attackers leverage a Leviathan of compromised infrastructure, based in every corner of the globe, to play hide-and-seek with network security, law enforcement, and counterintelligence personnel.

This presentation draws a new map of Planet Earth, based not on traditional parameters, but on hacker command and control (C2) communications. The primary data points used in this worldwide cyber survey are more than 30 million malware callbacks to over 200 countries and territories over an 18-month period, from January 2013 to June 2014.

First, this talk covers the techniques that hackers use to communicate with compromised infrastructure across the globe. The authors analyze the domains, protocols, ports, and websites used for malicious C2. They explain how covert C2 works, and how attackers keep their communications hidden from network security personnel.

Second, this talk looks at strategic impact. The authors examine relationships between the targeted industries and countries and the first-stage malware servers communicating with them. Traffic analysis is used to deduce important relationships, patterns, and trends in the data. This section correlates C2 communications to traditional geopolitical conflicts and considers whether computer network activity can be used to predict real world events.

In conclusion, the authors consider the future of this Leviathan, including whether governments can subdue it – and whether they would even want to.

Attend this presentation on August 7 at 10:15am PT in South Seas GH. Make sure to use #BHUSA and @FireEye if you plan to tweet highlights from the talk.

To view the whitepaper, click here.

Operation Poisoned Hurricane

| By , and | Targeted Attack, Threat Research |
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Introduction

Our worldwide sensor network provides researchers at FireEye Labs with unique opportunities to detect innovative tactics employed by malicious actors and protects our clients from these tactics. We recently uncovered a coordinated campaign targeting Internet infrastructure providers, a media organization, a financial services company, and an Asian government organization. The actor responsible for this campaign utilized legitimate digital certificates to sign their tools and employed innovative techniques to cloak their command and control traffic.

Hurricane Electric Redirection

In March of 2014, we detected Kaba (aka PlugX or SOGU) callback traffic to legitimate domains and IP addresses. Our initial conclusion was that this traffic was the result of malicious actors ‘sleeping’ their implants, by pointing their command and control domains at legitimate IP addresses. As this is a popular technique, we did not think much of this traffic at the time.

Further analysis revealed that the HTTP headers of the traffic in question contained a Host: entry for legitimate domains. As we have previously observed malware families that forge their HTTP headers to include legitimate domains in callback traffic, we concluded that the malware in this case was configured in the same way.

An example of the observed traffic is as follows:

POST /C542BB084F927229348B2A34 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
CG100: 0
CG103: 0
CG107: 61456
CG108: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C)
Host: www.adobe.com
Content-Length: 0
Cache-Control: no-cache

As we continued to see this odd traffic throughout the summer we began a search for malware samples responsible for this behavior. Via this research, we found a malware sample that we believe was responsible for at least some of the strange traffic that we had observed. The identified sample had the following properties:

MD5: 52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01
Size: 180296
Compile Time: 2013-10-15 05:17:37
Import Hash: b29eb78c7ec3f0e89bdd79e3f027c029
.rdata: d7b6e412ba892e9751f845432625bbb0
.text: ed0dd6825e3536d878f39009a7777edc
.data: 1bc25d2f0f3123bedea254ea7446dd50
.rsrc: 91484aa628cc64dc8eba867a8493c859
.reloc: f1df8fa77b5abb94563d5d97e5ccb8e2
RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9

This sample was signed with a legitimate digital certificate from the ‘Police Mutual Aid Association’. This certificate has a serial number of ‘06 55 69 a3 e2 61 40 91 28 a4 0a ff a9 0d 6d 10’.

Analysis of this Kaba sample revealed that it was configured to directly connect to both www.adobe.com and update.adobe.com. Obviously, this configuration does not make a lot of sense, as the actor would not be able to control their implants from anywhere on the Internet since they did not have direct control over these domains – unless the attackers were able to re-route traffic destined for these domains from specific victims. Indeed, further analysis of this Kaba variant revealed that it was also configured to use specific DNS resolvers. This sample was configured to resolve DNS lookups via Hurricane Electric’s nameservers of 216.218.130.2, 216.218.131.2, 216.218.132.2 and 216.66.1.2.

We found this interesting, so we investigated how these Hurricane Electric’s nameservers were configured. Subsequently, we found that anyone could register for a free account with Hurricane Electric’s hosted DNS service. Via this service, anyone with an account was able to register a zone and create A records for the registered zone and point those A records to any IP address they so desired. The dangerous aspect of this service is that anyone was able to hijack legitimate domains such as adobe.com. Although these nameservers are not recursors and were not designed to be queried directly by end users, they were returning results if queried directly for domains that were configured via Hurricane Electrics public DNS service. Furthermore, Hurricane Electric did not check if zones created by their users were already been registered or are otherwise legitimately owned by other parties.

As we continued this research, we identified 21 legitimate fully qualified domain names that had been hijacked via this technique by at least one APT actor. In addition to the adobe.com domain mentioned above, another one of the poisoned domains is www.outlook.com. A lookup of this domain via Google’s DNS resolvers returns expected results:

$ dig +short @8.8.8.8 www.outlook.com
www.outlook.com.glbdns2.microsoft.com.
www-nameast.outlook.com.
157.56.240.246
157.56.236.102
157.56.240.214
157.56.241.102
157.56.232.182
157.56.241.118
157.56.240.22

A quick lookup of these addresses reveal that Microsoft owns them:

157.56.240.246 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION
157.56.236.102 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION
157.56.240.214 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION
157.56.241.102 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION
157.56.232.182 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION
157.56.241.118 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION
157.56.240.22 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION

However, as recently as August 4, 2014 a lookup of the same www.outlook.com domain via Hurricane Electric’s resolvers returned entirely different results[1]:

$ dig +short @216.218.130.2 www.outlook.com
59.125.42.167

$ dig +short @216.218.131.2 www.outlook.com
59.125.42.167

$ dig +short @216.218.132.2 www.outlook.com
59.125.42.167

$ dig +short @216.66.1.2 www.outlook.com
59.125.42.167

$ whois -h asn.shadowserver.org ‘origin 59.125.42.167′
3462 | 59.125.0.0/17 | HINET | TW | HINET.NET | DATA COMMUNICATION BUSINESS GROUP

Passive DNS research on the 59.125.42.167 IP address revealed that multiple APT actors have previously used this IP address.

IP Address Domain First Seen Last Seen
59.125.42.167 ml65556.gicp[.]net 2014-06-23 2014-07-23
59.125.42.167 wf.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14
59.125.42.167 gl.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14
59.125.42.167 unix.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14

Additional researched uncovered more Kaba samples that were configured to leverage Hurricane Electric’s public DNS resolvers. Another sample has the following properties:

MD5: eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f
Size: 184304
Compile Time: 2013-11-26 17:39:25
Import Hash: f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18
Text Entry: 558bec83ec1056ff7508ff1518b00010
.rdata: 747abda5b3cd3494f056ab4345a909e4
.text: 475c20b8abc972710941ad6659492047
.data: d461f8f7b3f35b7c6855add6ae59e806
.rsrc: b195f57cb5e605cb719469492d9fe717
.reloc: d6b23cb71f214d33e56cf8f6a10c0c10
RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9

This sample is signed with a recently expired digital certificate from ‘MOCOMSYS INC’. This certificate has a serial number of ‘03 e5 a0 10 b0 5c 92 87 f8 23 c2 58 5f 54 7b 80’.

This sample used Hurricane Electric’s public DNS resolvers to route traffic to the hijacked domains of www.adobe.com and update.adobe.com. We also noted that this sample was configured to connect directly to 59.125.42.168 – one IP address away from the IP that received traffic from the hijacked www.outlook.com domain.

Passive DNS research revealed that this IP hosted the same set of known APT domains listed above:

IP Address Domain First Seen Last Seen
59.125.42.168 ml65556.gicp[.]net 2014-04-23 2014-07-24
59.125.42.168 wf.edsplan[.]com 2014-04-23 2014-05-14
59.125.42.168 gl.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-04 2014-05-14
59.125.42.168 unix.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-04 2014-05-14

While this problem does not directly impact users of www.adobe.com, www.outlook.com, or users of the other affected domains, it should not be dismissed as inconsequential. Actors that adopt this tactic and obfuscate the destination of their traffic through localized DNS hijacks can significantly complicate the job of network defenders.

Via our sensor network, we observed the actor responsible for this activity conducting a focused campaign. We observed this actor target:

  • Multiple Internet Infrastructure Service Providers in Asia and the United States
  • A Media Organization based in the United States
  • A financial institution based in Asia
  • An Asian government organization

Google Code Command and Control

Furthermore, we also discovered this same actor conducting a parallel campaign that leveraged Google Code for command and control. On August 1, 2014 we observed a malicious self-extracting executable (aka sfxrar) file downloaded from 211.125.81.203. This file had the following properties:

MD5: 17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1
Size: 282800 bytes

A valid certificate from ‘QTI INTERNATIONAL INC’ was used to sign this sfxrar. This certificate had a serial number of ‘2e df b9 fd cf a0 0c cb 5a b0 09 ee 3a db 97 b9’. The sfxrar contained the following files:

File Size MD5
msi.dll 11680 029c8f56dd89ceeaf928c3148d13eba7
msi.dll.dat 115218 62834d2c967003ba5284663b61ac85b5
setup.exe 34424 d00b3169f45e74bb22a1cd684341b14a

Setup.exe is a legitimate executable from Kaspersky used to load the Kaba (aka PlugX) files – msi.dll and msi.dll.dat.

google-code17

These Kaba files are configured to connect to Google Code – specifically code.google.com/p/udom/. On August 1, this Google Code project contained the encoded command “DZKSGAAALLBACDCDCDOCBDCDCDOCCDADIDOCBDADDZJS”.

def NewPlugx_C2_redir_decode(s):

rvalue = “”
for x in range(0, len(s), 2):
tmp0 = (ord(s[x+1]) - 0×41) << 4

rvalue += chr(ord(s[x]) + tmp0 - 0×41)
return rvalue

The command ‘DZKSGAAALLBACDCDCDOCBDCDCDOCCDADIDOCBDADDZJS’ decodes to 222.122.208.10. In a live environment, the Kaba implant would then connect to this IP address via UDP.

Further analysis of project at code.google.com/p/udom/ revealed the project owner, 0x916ftb691u, created a number of other projects. We decoded the commands hosted at these linked projects and found that they issued the following decoded commands:

112.175.143.22
59.125.42.167
153.121.57.213
61.82.71.10
202.181.133.169
61.78.32.139
61.78.32.148
202.181.133.216
59.125.42.168
119.205.217.104
222.122.208.10
112.175.143.16
222.122.208.9
27.122.13.204

It is likely that other yet to be discovered Kaba variants are configured to connect to these related Google Code projects and then redirect to this list of IP addresses.

Passive DNS analysis of these IP addresses revealed connections to the following known malicious infrastructure:

IP Address Domain First Seen Last Seen
27.122.13.204 bq.cppcp[.]com 2014-03-21 2014-05-08
112.175.143.16 uj.verisignss[.]com 2013-06-30 2013-08-13
112.175.143.16 www.verifyss[.]com 2013-06-30 2013-07-22
112.175.143.16 uj.byonds[.]com 2013-06-24 2013-07-22
112.175.143.16 uj.verifyss[.]com 2013-06-30 2013-07-22
59.125.42.168 ml65556.gicp[.]net 2014-04-23 2014-07-24
59.125.42.168 wf.edsplan[.]com 2014-04-23 2014-05-14
59.125.42.168 gl.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-04 2014-05-14
59.125.42.168 unix.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-04 2014-05-14
59.125.42.167 ml65556.gicp[.]net 2014-06-23 2014-07-23
59.125.42.167 wf.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14
59.125.42.167 gl.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14
59.125.42.167 unix.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14
61.78.32.148 door.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22
61.78.32.148 verisignss[.]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22
61.78.32.148 th.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22
61.78.32.148 tw.verisignss[.]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22
61.78.32.148 sd.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22
61.78.32.148 mail.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22
112.175.143.22 door.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 2014-04-30
112.175.143.22 th.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 2014-04-30
112.175.143.22 sd.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 2014-04-30
112.175.143.22 mail.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 2014-04-30
112.175.143.22 verisignss[.]com 2013-12-29 2014-04-30
112.175.143.22 tw.verisignss[.]com 2013-12-29 2014-04-30

Relationships Between Campaigns

As mentioned above the Kaba variant eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f shared a common import hash of f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 with many of the samples listed in this post. This samples was to use Hurricane Electric’s nameservers as well as connect directly to the IP address 59.125.42.168.

Note that we identified the same C2 IP 59.125.42.168 via our analysis of the malicious Google Code projects. Specifically, the Google Project at code.google.com/p/tempzz/, which is linked to the project at code.google.com/p/udom/, issued an encoded command that decoded to 59.125.42.168.

We also identified another related Kaba variant that connected to code.google.com/p/updata-server. This variant had the following properties:

MD5: 50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459
Size: 180600 bytes
Compile Time: 2014-04-01 03:28:31
Import Hash: f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18
.rdata: 103beeefae47caa0a5265541437b03a1
.text: e7c4c2445e76bac81125b2a47384d83f
.data: 5216d6e6834913c6cc75f40c8f70cff8
.rsrc: b195f57cb5e605cb719469492d9fe717
.reloc: f7d9d69b8d36fee5a63f78cbd3238414
RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9

This sample was signed with a valid digital certificate from ‘PIXELPLUS CO., LTD’ and had a serial number of ‘0f e7 df 6c 4b 9a 33 b8 3d 04 e2 3e 98 a7 7c ce’.

In addition to sharing the same Import hash of f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 seen in other samples listed throughout this post, 50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459 contained a RT_VERSION resource of 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9. This same RT_VERSION was used in a number of other related samples including:

MD5 C2 Uses Hurricane Electric
7e6c8992026a79c080f88103f6a69d2c h.cppcp[.]comu.cppcp[.]com NO
52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01 www.adobe[.]comupdate.adobe[.]com YES
787c6cf3cb18feeabe4227ec6b19db01 ns.lovechapelumc[.]orgns1.lovechapelumc[.]org NO

20140803-Sogu-TTPs

Conclusion

These coordinated campaigns demonstrate that APT actors are determined to continue operations. As computer network defenders increase their capabilities to identify and block these campaigns by deploying more advanced detection technologies, threat actors will continue to adopt creative evasion techniques.

We observed the following evasion techniques in these campaigns:

    • The use of legitimate digital certificates to sign malware
    • The use of Hurricane Electrics public DNS resolvers to redirect command and control traffic
    • The use of Google Code to obfuscate the location of command and control servers

While none of these techniques are necessarily new, in combination, they are certainly both creative and have been observed to be effective. Although the resultant C2 traffic can be successfully detected and tracked, the fact that the malware appears to beacon to legitimate domains may lull defenders into a false sense of security. Network defenders should continue to study the evolution of advanced threat actors, as these adversaries will continue to evolve in pursuit of their designated objectives.

Related MD5s
17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1
eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f
434b539489c588db90574a64f9ce781f
7e6c8992026a79c080f88103f6a69d2c
52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01
787c6cf3cb18feeabe4227ec6b19db01
50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459
d51050cf98cc723f0173d1c058c12721

Digital Certificates
MOCOMSYS INC, (03 e5 a0 10 b0 5c 92 87 f8 23 c2 58 5f 54 7b 80)
PIXELPLUS CO., LTD., (0f e7 df 6c 4b 9a 33 b8 3d 04 e2 3e 98 a7 7c ce)
Police Mutual Aid Association (06 55 69 a3 e2 61 40 91 28 a4 0a ff a9 0d 6d 10)
QTI INTERNATIONAL INC (2e df b9 fd cf a0 0c cb 5a b0 09 ee 3a db 97 b9)
Ssangyong Motor Co. (1D 2B C8 46 D1 00 D8 FB 94 FA EA 4B 7B 5F D8 94)
jtc (72 B4 F5 66 7F 69 F5 43 21 A9 40 09 97 4C CC F8)

Footnotes
[1] As of August 4, 2014 Hurricane Electric was no longer returning answers for www.outlook.com or the other affected domains.
[2] This same encoding algorithm was previously described by Cassidian at http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/01/plugx-some-uncovered-points.html

Operation Arachnophobia: An Introduction

| By and | Threat Intelligence, Threat Research |
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We recently had the opportunity to collaborate with ThreatConnect’s Intelligence Research Team (TCIRT) to conduct follow-up reporting on threat group activity that appears to originate from Pakistan. The TCIRT originally reported on this activity in August 2013 in their “Where There is Smoke, There is Fire” blog post. This post covered a threat group using malware and apparent lures that would be effective against Indian targets: an Indian Government Ministry of Defense pension memorandum and an apparent lure related to Sarabjit Singh, an Indian national who died in a Pakistani prison last year.

Our collaboration with ThreatConnect centered on technical analysis of the BITTERBUG malware family and other technical characteristics of the activity. ThreatConnect provided deep analysis of open source data to highlight interesting persona and organizational details. FireEye Labs analysts have also been tracking this group’s activities – identifying and tracking their custom malware family that we call BITTERBUG and their command and control (C2) servers.

The report was released today assessing new information on this group and identifying new factors that draw further suspicion to Pakistan as the probable origination point. From the earliest samples of BITTERBUG to its latest variants, we have observed changes that show movement away from specific debug paths to new, generic paths; a process that occurred following TCIRT’s original blog post.

The group appears to have remained active after the TCIRT blog post, using new BITTERBUG malware variants with the more-generic embedded file paths. During this same timeframe, we observed these variants packaged with various support components and using lures related to the December 2013 arrest of Indian diplomat Devyani Khobragade in the United States and the March 2014 disappearance of Malaysia Airlines flight 370 (cast in these ‘lure’ emails as a Pakistan-related hijacking). Though BITTERBUG deployment methods remained similar throughout, we also observed new deployment behaviors following the August blog post.

We encourage you to read the new paper here http://www.threatconnect.com/arachnophobia.

Security Perspective


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Operation Poisoned Hurricane: Lessons for CISOs

| By | Advanced Threat Trends, Security Perspective |
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The tactics described in “Operation Poisoned Hurricane” should come as a stark reminder that advanced threat actors do not stand still. They continue to refine their tradecraft, finding new and innovative ways to bypass security controls and evade detection.

The technical details of the evasion techniques are complex, but the lessons for the CISO are clear:

  1. Traffic to a legitimate website is not always legitimate traffic – malware could be hiding command and control communications in traffic to reputable sites.
  2. Don’t allow direct Internet access, ever. The DNS hijacking described in the blog relies on directly sending DNS queries.
  3. File-based malware controls are being successfully evaded in the wild.

What can you do to protect your organisation from these threats? My suggestions are:

  1. Make sure you have a well-architected Internet proxy architecture that prevents direct connectivity from your network:
    • Never allow hosts other than your secure external DNS resolver to send DNS queries to the Internet. Period.
    • Record all internal DNS queries, these are a possible sign of a compromised machine.
  2. Put in place a malware detection solution that can identify multi-vector, multi-stage malware execution:
    • These attacks used legitimate, signed binaries from a known security company to load malicious code contained in other files as part of a multi-stage attack. File-oriented security controls do not detect these attacks, you need a full behavioural analytics engine to see the attack.
    • Don’t assume that a signed binary is safe. Automated analysis of code behaviour in an execution environment is critical.
  3. Ensure you can detect and block command & control traffic from compromised users, even if it is to legitimate websites:
    • Sophisticated attackers can use blogs, code repositories, even comments on social media, to send and receive command & control signals.
    • Reputation-based detection is not sufficient, you need detection and protection that can understand new command and control tactics based on automated behavioural analysis.

The attackers are evolving their attacks, are you evolving your defenses fast enough to keep them out?

Your Locker of Information for CryptoLocker Decryption

| By and | Security News, Security Perspective |
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Ransomware is a particularly nasty piece of malware that takes infected machines hostage. CryptoLocker was successful at garnering multi-millions in ransom payments the first two months of CryptoLocker’s distribution, according to a recent blog by FireEye regarding the takeover of CryptoLocker infrastructure - Operation Tovar.

Operation Tovar helped tear down the infrastructure used by attackers, but there are still many instances where users are still being infected with ransomware. After the success of Operation Tovar, there were few resources available to help decrypt files that were still encrypted with the attacker’s private key.

While not particularly innovative, CryptoLocker was successful because it encrypts the files of computers it infected and then demanded a ransom for a private key to decrypt those files. The harsh reality of a situation like this is, not many people back up their data. In some cases, the backups would be encrypted if mounted to an infected machine. As a result, many of the victims felt helpless at this point, and paid the ransom - typically around $300. A simple description of the way that CryptoLocker works can be found below:

  1. CryptoLocker arrives on a victim’s machine through a variety of techniques such as spear-phishing emails or watering hole attacks.
  2. CryptoLocker then connects to randomly generated domain (via DGAs) to download a specific RSA public key.
  3. At that point, an AES-256 key is created for each file on the system.
  4. CryptoLocker then encrypts all of the supported files using the generated key from step 3.
  5. The generated key is then encrypted with the downloaded RSA public key from step 2.
  6. And finally, the AES-key is written to the beginning of the encrypted files, thus requiring the private key to decrypt.
crypto1

Figure 1: Screenshot of victim machine infected with CryptoLocker

Not all CryptoLocker variants are created equal. There are several copycats and hybrid versions of Crytpolocker that exist, ranging from programs like CryptoDefense, PowerLocker, TorLocker and CryptorBit, to variants that are not necessarily named but have modified functionality, such as using Yahoo Messenger as a propagation technique.

Decryption Assistance

To help solve the problem of victims’ files still being encrypted, we leveraged our close partnership with Fox-IT. We developed a decryption assistance website and corresponding tool designed to help those afflicted with the original CryptoLocker malware. Through various partnerships and reverse engineering engagements, Fox-IT and FireEye have ascertained many of the private keys associated with CryptoLocker. Having these private keys allows for decryption of files that are encrypted by CryptoLocker.

FireEye and Fox IT have created a webpage, https://www.decryptcryptolocker.com, where a user can upload an encrypted CryptoLocker file. Based on this upload, the user will be provided with the option to download a private key that should decrypt their affected files. The site also provides instructions on how to apply this key to the files encrypted by CryptoLocker to decrypt those files.

To use the site, simply upload an encrypted file without any confidential information. (Please keep in mind, we will not permanently store, view, or modify your file in any fashion.) Enter your email address, to ensure the private key associated with the file is sent to the correct individual. Ensure you enter the correct number or phrase in the Captcha entry field.

crypto2

Figure 2: Screenshot of https://www.DecryptCryptoLocker.com

After clicking “Decrypt It!”, you will be presented with instructions to download the Decryptolocker.exe tool from https://www.decryptCryptoLocker.com (Figure 3). In addition, your private key will be sent to the email addresses specified.

crypto32

Figure 3: DecryptCryptoLocker decryption result page

After receiving the email (Figure 4), you will then select the key and utilize it in conjunction with Decryptolocker.exe.

crypto4

Figure 4: Email containing private key

At this point, the user opens a Windows Command Prompt, and browses to the directory of the Decryptolocker.exe tool and the locked file. (Please note that the directory of the locked file must be specified if the file is not local to the tool’s directory.) The user must enter the command exactly as specified on the successful decryption page. The command structure should be used as the following:

Decryptolocker.exe -key “<key>” <Lockedfile.doc>

Upon successful execution of the tool, the user should be presented with a prompt indicating decryption was successful (Figure 5).

crypto5

Figure 5: Successful decryption of File1-1.doc

Conclusion

Operation Tovar made a clear impact on the distribution of and infection of machines by CryptoLocker. However, there have been no known avenues available designed to help users get their encrypted files back without making significant payments to those responsible for infecting machines in the first place. While the remediation of infected machines can be somewhat difficult, hopefully with the help of https://www.decryptCryptoLocker.com and Decryptolocker.exe, we can help you get back some of the valuable files that may still be encrypted.

As always, to help prevent a threat like this from affecting you and your data, ensure you backup your data. Ideally, this would be done in at least two locations: One would be on premises (such as an external hard drive), and the other would be off premises (such as cloud storage).

FAQ

Are all encrypted files afflicted with CryptoLocker decryptable with this tool?

We believe we recovered everything the from the CryptoLocker database. However, we are aware that there could be a limited data chunk that could be missing which is related to either the takedown or interruptions of the CryptoLocker backend infrastructure. As a result, certain files may not be decryptable. Also, new variants of CryptoLocker may be released at any time, and the tools we discuss here or have made available may not be able to decrypt files infected with these more recent variants.

Does this tool work against CryptoLocker variants?

There are several variants of CryptoLocker, all functioning in different ways. While these variants do appear similar to CryptoLocker, this tool may not be successful in all decryption processes because of code and functionality variances.

Does any of our data get stored by FireEye or Fox-IT?

Under no circumstances does personal data get stored, processed or examined by FireEye or Fox-IT when using this tool.

Is this service free?

The Decryptolocker.exe tool is available at no cost via the website to anyone that has been compromised with CryptoLocker.

How can I use the Decryptolocker.exe tool?

The Decryptolocker.exe tool is designed to perform a few different types of functions. Here are some examples of various prompts you can enter, depending on the result you would like to obtain.

1) If you would like to test a file if it is encrypted with CryptoLocker, you can enter:
Decryptolocker.exe -find File1.doc

2) If you would like to find all files encrypted with CryptoLocker in a directory, you can enter:

Decryptolocker.exe -find -r “C:\FolderName”

Note: Remember to include the “-r”

3) If you would like to decrypt a file encrypted with CryptoLocker, you can enter:

Decryptolocker.exe -key “<your private key provided in email>” File1.doc

4) If you would like to decrypt all files in a folder, you can enter:

Decryptolocker.exe -key “<your private key provided in email>” C:\FolderName\*

Note: Remember to include the “*” at the end

5) If you would like to decrypt all the files in a folder or drive recursively, you can enter:

Decryptolocker.exe -key “<your private key provided in email>” -r C:\

Note: Decryptolocker.exe creates a backup of all encrypted files in the same directory before writing the decrypted file. If you do not have enough space for these files, then the prompt may not execute, and your computer may run more slowly. Ensure you have sufficient file space before proceeding.

 

Disclaimers

There are several variants of CryptoLocker, all functioning in different ways. While these variants do appear similar to CryptoLocker, the tools discussed here may not successfully decrypt files encrypted by every variant because of differences in the programs or for other reasons. Also, while we have many unlocking keys, there is a possibility that we will be unable to decrypt your files.

References

https://www.fireeyesolution.com/blog/technical/2014/07/operation-tovar-the-latest-attempt-to-eliminate-key-botnets.html

http://blog.fortinet.com/A-Closer-Look-at-CryptoLocker-s-DGA/

https://www.fox-it.com/en/

Black Hat USA 2014: The Ultimate Cybersecurity Event

| By | Business of Security, Security Perspective |
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Black Hat USA is about to return for its 17th year in Las Vegas, NV. The show will bring together the brightest minds in the world of cybersecurity for a six-day period where learning, networking, and skill-building top the activity list. FireEye will be there in full force.

Here is what you need to know:

  • Be on the Look Out: FireEye and Mandiant will have a presence at the conference in booths 411 and 246, respectively. You’ll be able to watch live demos, attend presentations, and get the latest updates on our full platform of technologies and services.
  • Jump into the Trenches: Join FireEye CTO Dave Merkel on Thursday, August 7 from 1-2PM for his insightful presentation “Lessons from the Trenches: Advanced Techniques for Dealing with Advanced Attacks” which will review the latest approaches attackers are using to compromise organizations and, more importantly, what the most innovative security teams are doing to stay ahead. Mr. Merkel will be drawing on data and anecdotes from hundreds of organizations, and will outline how leading security teams have reorganized, re-architected and realigned their security strategies.
  • Take a Practical View: Visit the FireEye booth (411) for ongoing presentations with a focus on various case studies that can be applied to everyday activities. Presentations will be interactive and include audience responses.
  • View Live Demonstrations: FireEye will have eight demo stations networked to live products and solutions to recreate real and recognizable environments.
  • Come out and Party: Join the FireEye crew for an event co-sponsored by Rapid7 on Wednesday, August 6 at XS Nightclub in Wynn/Encore. Register for the party here!
  • M After Dark: There is nothing quite like Mandiant’s “M After Dark” party, which will take place on August 5, from 7-9PM at the Eye Candy Sound Lounge at Mandalay Bay. Click here for registration information.

We hope to see you in Las Vegas the week of August 2 through August 7. If you are unable to attend, check back on the blog for insights from the conference.

 

Security as a Differentiator: Investis Partners With FireEye Managed Defense to Offer Its Clients the Very Best in Cybersecurity

| By | Business of Security, Incident Response, Security Perspective, Technology |
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This is a contributed post from Alex Booth, COO, Investis

As a provider of digital corporate communication services to many of the world’s leading companies, information security is of critical importance to us here at Investis. In order to be the world’s safest platform for managing digital communications and hosting corporate sites, we wanted the strongest security partner in the business. As COO of Investis, this was a critical decision which is why I wanted to share the reasons we chose FireEye Managed Defense. To give you the short version, though, the choice was easy - the long version of which you can see in the video below or get a synopsis of in this post…

We are an ISO 27001 certified company and a member of CISP, the UK government’s cybersecurity information partnership. We believe you can never take security too seriously, especially in a digital landscape with increasingly sophisticated cybercrime. With that in mind, we wanted the most advanced solution to protect our environment and clients, and FireEye was the perfect partner to help us safeguard against advanced threats.

FireEye is the cybersecurity partner of choice for many of the US’s largest firms and its subsidiary, Mandiant, was selected by the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) as one of four vendors certified to respond to cybersecurity attacks targeting the UK’s national infrastructure.

As a result of an on-site assessment by Mandiant consultants, we chose to augment our security team with the FireEye Managed Defense service.

We are looking forward to working with the great team over at FireEye to ensure we offer our clients the very best in cybersecurity.

US GAO Report Highlights Incident Response Shortcomings

| By | Executive Perspectives, Security Perspective |
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On May 30th, 2014, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report titled “Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Cyber Incident Response Practices.” GAO conducted its research by randomly selecting six government agencies, then selecting a statistically significant number of incident reports (40 from each organization), documented during 2012. GAO then evaluated how the agencies performed, based on the reports. GAO compared the documented incident response actions to requirements set by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide. The results were surprising and I will explain the significance of several excerpts in this post.

First, “agencies had recorded actions to halt the spread of, or otherwise limit, the damage caused by an incident in about 75 percent of incidents government-wide. However, agencies did not demonstrate such actions for about 25 percent of incidents government-wide.”

This comment references the need to contain an intrusion. If a government agency fails to completely contain an intrusion, any gaps leave the adversary freedom of maneuver. He can exploit the containment failure to proliferate to other systems and remain in control of an organization’s systems. Anything less than 100% containment is essentially 0% containment.

Second, “for about 77 percent of incidents government-wide, the agencies had identified and eliminated the remaining elements of the incident. However, agencies did not demonstrate that they had effectively eradicated incidents in about 23 percent of incidents.”

This comment references the need to remove an intruder from a compromised organization. Similar to the need for 100% containment, one must also achieve 100% removal in order to completely frustrate the adversary. If an adversary retains access to even one system, he can rebuild his position and retake control of the victim.

Third, “agencies returned their systems to an operationally ready state for about 81 percent of incidents government-wide. However, they had not consistently documented remedial actions on whether they had taken steps to prevent an incident from reoccurring. Specifically, agencies did not demonstrate that they had acted to prevent an incident from reoccurring in about 49 percent of incidents government-wide.”

This comment describes the need to learn from intrusions and implement remediation. If a victim fails to make the environment tougher for the adversary, the intruder will likely return using the same techniques that he utilized to first gain access.

Finally, a search of the entire GAO report for the word “strategy” produced zero hits. Beyond being disappointed by the three excerpts I highlighted above, I am dismayed to not hear GAO discuss the need for a security strategy for organizations. Incident response is not a technical action. IR should be part of a business process, done as part of an operation that implements a strategy understood and approved by the highest levels of management. Furthermore, the GAO report did not really evaluate the consequences of the three documented failures and the lack of concrete security strategies. Had GAO taken that step, they might have concluded that the agencies continue to face severe security challenges.