Without the ability to perform offensive counter-operations, or the aid of significant SIGINT capabilities, 99 percent of private companies lack the ability to do true attribution to the operator level of cyber attacks. This difficulty is especially exacerbated when trying to analyze disjoint malware artifacts from the exploit life cycle. That is to say, even when a skilled malware analyst is handed an executable file out of context, it is difficult or impossible for him or her to say whether the attacker was Hyun-soo Kim, Ivo Russinov, or Edward Snowden. Most non-government organizations simply lack the situational G2 and knowledge of adversary TTPs to confidently (or at least, accurately) point the finger at a specific actor, or frankly, even a nation-state. Most of this reality is due to the fact that they can only see the small subset of malware that a) has been used against them, and b) that they can detect. That being said, when examining attacks within their full context - from targeting, to attacking, to the installation of long term implants, to lateral movement, and finally to data exfiltration - certain tippers can be gleaned from technical artifacts left in each stage that help paint the picture in broad strokes.
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