Using Honeypots to Sniff and Snuff out Botnets, part 1

In recent years, honeypots have seemed to fall out of favor with security researchers.  The reason for this is pretty straightforward - a classic honeypot (a single IP running vulnerable services) or honeynet (a honeypot on multiple IPs) will only catch attacks that actively attempt to propagate.  These attacks could be similar to a loud worm like Blaster, Gimmiv, Slammer, etc, or they could be a less noisy attack such as a bot that will only scan a local subnet.

Why am I to presume that there aren't enough researchers employing honeypots and honeynets?  Simple - the botnets that use these types of attacks to spread have not had their controllers (C&Cs) fluctuate locations (IPs) in months or more.  Of course, this lapse in abuse notifications is on me as well, but I hope to rectify the situation by notifying the offending upstream providers relentlessly going forward.

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