This is a continuation of my previous posting on botnets that propagate through remotely exploitable vulnerabilities.
This is a continuation of my previous posting on botnets that propagate through remotely exploitable vulnerabilities.
In recent years, honeypots have seemed to fall out of favor with security researchers. The reason for this is pretty straightforward - a classic honeypot (a single IP running vulnerable services) or honeynet (a honeypot on multiple IPs) will only catch attacks that actively attempt to propagate. These attacks could be similar to a loud worm like Blaster, Gimmiv, Slammer, etc, or they could be a less noisy attack such as a bot that will only scan a local subnet.
Why am I to presume that there aren't enough researchers employing honeypots and honeynets? Simple - the botnets that use these types of attacks to spread have not had their controllers (C&Cs) fluctuate locations (IPs) in months or more. Of course, this lapse in abuse notifications is on me as well, but I hope to rectify the situation by notifying the offending upstream providers relentlessly going forward.